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Abstract:
Purpose: In a macroeconomic environment with the non-tradable shares reform, financial crisis,
tax reform and monetary policy, to examine the dynamic characteristics and factors of  the debt
maturity  structure,  this  research  tends  to  offer  an  empirical  analysis  about  Chinese  listed
companies in different industries.
Design/methodology/approach: Learned from Leary (2009), Voutsinas and Werner (2011), this study
designs a model of  debt maturity structure with an unbalanced panel data set. Consists of  1352
Chinese listed companies with 8124 observations during the period of  2003-2011, the sample
passed Hausman test, and the findings support the fixed effects model. 
Findings: Besides the factors that have been confirmed by previous researches, debt maturity
structure is  also sensitive to other factors,  such as economic expectations,  monetary policy,
financial restrictions and changes in tax rates. 
Research limitations/implications: There  are  still  many  cases,  which  affect  the  debt  maturity
structure, are worth of  further exploring, for instance, the impact of  lagged monetary policy,
the determinants of  short-term debt ratio and the cost of  operating.
Practical implications: From the macro point of  view, research in this area enables the government
to introduce more suitable  policies  that  direct  and promote the  development  of  the  bond
market. From the micro point of  view, it spurs corporations to choose proper finance structure.
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Firms can learn from the research to adopt the efficient method and term of  financing as well
as debt structure. 
Originality/value: In some way, conclusions of  this paper contribute to the study of  dynamic
characteristics and factors of  debt maturity structure in Chinese listed companies.
Keywords: maturity structure, debt structure, dynamic characteristics, panel data
1. Introduction
Since the Miller and Modigliani (1958) carried on the study of capital structure about modern
enterprises,  a large number of documents concerning the examination of capital  structure
theory appeared. With the development and innovation of the capital  structure theory, the
focus is  gradually  turning  from  the  basic  choice  of  leverage  to  the  debt  structure
characteristics. And based on the development of the capital structure theory, there formed the
trade-off theory, agency costs theory, information asymmetry hypothesis and tax hypothesis of
debt maturity structure  (Ho & Robinson, 1994). These basic theories have led to a series of
derivate research on the determinants of debt structure (Bradley,  Gregg & Han Kim, 1984;
Titman & Wessels, 1988).
Compared with the mature financing environment abroad, the financing environment in China,
under the economic transformation, is immature. The immature market has many restrictions
that make the debt structure of the listed companies in China more complicated, for instance,
the imbalanced development of capital markets and imperfect protection of investor. Especially
after the financial crisis, what are the dynamic characteristics of the debt maturity structure in
China's listed companies?  Which factors affect the debt maturity structure? Can the western
theories of debt maturity structure explain the debt structure problems in China? All  these
issues need theoretical analysis and empirical testing.
In  this  context,  focusing  on  the  debt  structure  of  listed  companies  in  China,  this  paper
theoretically analyzes the impacts of macroeconomic factors and microeconomic factors on the
debt structure. Furthermore, using a data set of 1352 companies during 2003-2011, this study
analyzes the debt maturity structure empirically to test the dynamic characteristics and factors
of the debt maturity structure in China. Researches in this area, from the macro point of view,
enable  the  government  to  introduce  more  suitable  policy  to  direct  and  promote  the
development of the bond market; from the micro point of view,  they spur corporations to
choose proper finance structure. Firms can learn from the researches to choose the efficient
method and term of financing as well as debt structure.
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2. Literature Review
Begin with the conclusion of Merton (1974),  who held that  the debt maturity  structure is
independent of enterprise value, many scholars began to study the debt maturity structure as
well as the factors affect it. Now researches about the dynamic characteristics of debt maturity
structure at home and abroad mainly focus on the following three aspects:
• Researches  on  debt  maturity  structure  theory. According  to  the  existing
literatures, the theory of debt maturity structure falls into three categories: agency
costs (Jensen,  1986),  the  deadline  supporting  theory  (Hart  &  Moore,  1994), and
information economics theory  (Flannery, 1986; Kale  & Noe, 1990; Diamond, 1991).
The  agency  cost  theory  holds  that  the  liabilities  operations  of  modern  enterprise
caused the conflicts between creditors and shareholders, and accompany the conflicts,
the agency costs of debt appeared. The main views of agency cost theory are: First,
the short-term debt helps companies to avoid the overinvestment problems and solve
the problems of insufficient  investments;  second,  debt maturity  increased with the
increase of the firm size. The main views of the deadline supporting theory are: the
debt maturity should be corresponded with the terms of the corporate assets, and debt
maturity has an inverse relationship  with asset depreciation rate. The main point of
information  economics  theory  believes  that,  the  risk  of  the  borrower  is  positively
correlated with the debt maturity, and companies generally prefer to issue short-term
debts. What’s more, debt maturity is a non-monotonic function of the enterprise risk;
borrowers of  lowest  risk  or highest  risk  both  have  more  short-term  debts,  while
borrowers with moderate risk have more long-term debts.
• Tests of debt maturity theory. The test of debt maturity structure theory mainly
concentrated on the trade-off theory (Miller, 1977; Myers, 2001) and the pecking order
theory (Myers, 1984; Myers & Majluf, 1984). The trade-off theory holds that, instead of
equity finance, debt finance can increase the market value of the enterprise due to the
exits  of  the  tax  shield.  But the  rising  debt  levels  will  increase  the  financial  cost
(Philosophov  &  Philosophov 2005; Bany-Ariffin,  Mat Nor & McGowan Jr.,  2010),  and
intensify the agency  conflicts  of  the  companies (Jensen  & Meckling,  1976  for;
Frankfurter  & Philippatos,  1992).  The  pecking  order  theory  believes  that, financial
managers have the information that investors do not have. Therefore, enterprises tend
to prefer internal finance, which do not suffer from information asymmetry, instead of
external finance. If external finance is still needed, companies will issue bonds first. They
insist  that  specific  target  capital  structure is  inexistence.  In  the  past  30  years,
researches about the validity of these two theories have not been unanimously approved
so far  (Hovakimian,  Hovakimian & Tehranian,  2004; Huang  & Song, 2006; Kayo &
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Kimura,  2011; Gaud,  Hoesli,  &  Bender, 2006; Frank  & Goyal,  2004;  Fuxiu,  Yaohui,
Zhengfei & Yan, 2008; Leary, 2009).
• Factors affect the debt maturity structure. The existing literatures suggest that,
the main factors affecting debt maturity structure are firm size (Taub, 1975; Chen &
Strange,  2005;  Zuoping-Xiao,  2009;  Zengfu-Li,  Yan-Gu  &  Yujun-Lian,  2012),
profitability(Titam & Wessels, 1988; Nunes & Serrasqueiro, 2007), non-debt tax shield
(Bradley et al., 1984; Lord & McIntyre, 2003), tangible assets (Titam & Wessels, 1988;
Gaud et al., 2006), accounts payable (Atanasova & Wilson, 2004; Steijvers, 2004), tax
rates  (Gordon  & Lee,  2001;  Zuoping-Xiao,  2009;  Zengfu-Li,  Yan-Gu  & Yujun-Lian,
2012), ownership (Huacheng, Chunling & Chuan, 2007; Kun & Junrui, 2012), Bank of
dependence (Carpenter,  Fazzari  & Petersen,  1994;  Cantillo  & Wright,  2000; Leary,
2009; Voutsinas & Werner, 2011) and so on. However, the positive or negative impact
of these factors is a big controversial issue. Recently, the studies of Bougheas, Mizen
and Yalcin (2006), Faulkender and Petersen (2006), Leary (2009) and  Qinglu, Xiang
and Qingchuan (2012) found the importance of financial  constraints  and monetary
policy.
There are a large number of literatures researching on capital structure of listed companies in
China, but rarely considering  the factors and the  dynamic  characteristics  of  debt  maturity
structure under the environment of shareholder structure reform (begin in 2005), financial
crisis (2008), tax rate reform (the new corporate income tax law passed through on March 16,
2007, and implemented on January 1, 2008) and monetary policy.
3. Methodology and data set 
3.1. Sample 
Consisting of companies listed in the A-share and B-share stock market of China over the
period 2003-2011, the data set of this paper was taken from the CSMAR Solution database,
and was filtered by following limitations: 
• Excluding the listed companies in financial sector, because the accounting management
and  the  liabilities  characteristics  of  the  enterprises  in  financial  sector  and  other
enterprises are different.
• Excluding the listed companies  of  ST * ST, SST, S * ST and S, because the financial
structure of these companies prevalently have problems.
• Excluding  the  companies  with  missing accounting  data  and  abnormal  stock  price
changes, and the assets value of it unchanged. 
The resulting data set consists of 8124 observations (see Table 1).
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Table 1 presents the changes  in the number of the state-owned enterprises and non-state-
owned enterprises in various sectors during 2003-2011. As seen from the table, the number of
non-state-owned enterprises was significantly greater than the state-owned enterprises after
the reform of shareholder structure. And this trend becomes more apparent after 2008.
Industry Nature of enterprise 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Food and 
beverage 
Non state-owned 
enterprises 9 12 14 17 19 22 45 56 61
State owned enterprise 42 42 41 40 33 35 17 17 20
Petrochemical 
Non state-owned 
enterprises 10 16 11 20 33 44 85 130 179
State owned enterprise 94 100 99 98 98 95 56 56 36
Electronics
Non state-owned 
enterprises 8 9 9 12 19 31 43 81 97
State owned enterprise 30 32 33 32 43 37 22 26 25
Metal and 
nonmetal 
Non state-owned 
enterprises 11 14 16 17 29 35 66 110 137
State owned enterprise 80 81 79 86 85 83 55 40 31
Machinery and 
equipment
Non state-owned 
enterprises 27 32 38 41 69 81 147 223 313
State owned enterprise 128 140 139 141 137 139 97 112 100
Pharmaceutical 
and biotech
Non state-owned 
enterprises 14 25 24 23 32 45 68 82 106
State owned enterprise 55 59 56 59 52 38 21 22 19
Real estate
Non state-owned 
enterprises 28 30 31 39 33 38 67 78 83
State owned enterprise 67 68 66 67 64 64 48 36 30
Wholesale and 
retail
Non state-owned 
enterprises 9 11 12 17 21 33 62 74 89
State owned enterprise 72 74 74 70 68 60 33 32 26
Total
Non state-owned 
enterprises 116 149 155 186 255 329 583 834 1065
State owned enterprise 568 596 587 593 580 551 349 341 287
Total 684 745 742 779 835 880 932 1175 1352
Table 1. Distribution table of companies in different industries over the period 2003-2011
Figure 1  and  2 shows that, the average long-term debt ratio of state-owned enterprises is
higher than the non-state-owned enterprises after 2006, and the  reverse happens with the
average short-term debt ratio after 2007. In general, the Asset-liability ratios of the state-
owned  enterprises  are higher  than  that  of  the  non-state-owned  enterprises.  This  can  be
explained as that, due to the existence of the natural link between the state-owned enterprises
and  the  five state-owned  big  banks, the  state-owned  enterprises  faced  better  financing
environment than the non-state-owned enterprises. 
Figure 3 shows the changes in the asset-liability ratio and short-term liabilities rate of state-
owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises during the year 2003-2011. As seen in the
figure, there is a strong positive relationship between the asset-liability ratio and short-term
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debt ratio  to both state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises. There are two
questions  need  to  be  thought  about:  First,  the  corporate  bond  market  in  China  is
underdeveloped, and corporate debt finance depends mainly on the currency market. Then,
although short-term debt can reduce the cost of capital, it may bring financial distress.
Figure 1. Long-term debt ratio of the state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned 
enterprises over the period 2003-2011
Figure 2. Short-term debt ratio of the state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned 
enterprises over the period 2003-2011
Figure 3. The tendency of the Asset-liability ratio and short-term debt ratio of the state-owned
enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises over the period 2003-2011
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3.2. Variables
This  research  is  designed to  examine  the dynamic  characteristics  and factors  of  the debt
maturity structure in various industries of Chinese listed companies. It takes into consideration
of important changes in the macroeconomic environment, like tradable share, financial crisis,
tax reform and monetary policy. Inspired by existing domestic and international literatures,
following variables have been set with the consideration of the macroeconomic environment in
China. Specific definition of the variables is shown in Table 2.
Variable Variable definition
Leverage Total debts/ total assets
Short-term leverage (Commercial paper + short-term borrowings + short-term corporate bonds + long -termdebt and maturities within 1 year) / total assets
Long-term leverage (Long-term corporate bonds + long-term debt) 
Bankdep1 Dummy variable. 1 if total debt increased than the year before, and 0 if not.
Bankdep2 Dummy variable. 1 if current liabilities increased than the year before, and 0 if not.
Money Policy Dummy variable. 1 if interest rate increased than the year before, and 0 if not
Money Policy(t-1) Dummy variable. 1 if  the  growth rate of total loans in all banks increased than the yearbefore, and 0 if not and unchanged.
Tangfassets Total tangible fixed assets/total assets
EBIT EBIT/total assets
Retearnings (Profit  reserves+various  voluntary  reserves  +retained  earnings  carnings  forward)/totalassets
Non-debt tax shields
Over the period 2003-2008：[PROFIT-(T/0.33)]/total assets；over the period 2009-2011：
[PROFIT-(T/0.25)]/total assets. PROFIT is the net profit before tax, and T is the taxes of
the sample corporate. 
Accountspay (Notes payable and accounts payable)/total assets
Logsales Natural logarithm of sales and operating revenue
Equity to debt ratio Equity/Debt
Nature of enterprise Dummy variable. 1 if state-owned corporate, and 0 if not (A firm is classified as a state-owned corporate only if the ownership share of the state is more than 0)
Gdp Growth [(Gdpt-Gdpt-1)/ Gdpt-1]*100%
Industryi
Dummy  variable.  The  food  and  beverage  industry  has  the  value  of  1, petrochemical
industry of 2, electronics industry of 3, metal and nonmetal industry of 4, machinery and
equipment industry of 5, pharmaceutical and biotech industry of 6, real estate industry of
7, and wholesale and retail industry of 8.
Table 2. Variables definitions
3.3. Methodology
According to the dynamic characteristics of the debt maturity structure (asset-liability ratio,
long-term debt ratio and short-term debt ratio) of the listed companies in China, this paper
builds a panel  data model.  Learned from Leary (2009),  Voutsinas and Werner (2011), we
designed the following models:
, 1 1 2 2 3i ty a a Bankdep a Bankdep a Monetarypolicy= + + +
9 8 2 6
, , ,
1 1 1 1
t i i i t i t i i t
t i i i
W Industy D x uβ ε
= = = =
+ + + + + +∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
,
(1)
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, 1 1 2 2 3 1i t ty a a Bankdep a Bankdep a Monetarypolicy −= + + +
9 8 2 6
, , ,
1 1 1 1
t i i i t i t i i t
t i i i
W Industy D x uβ ε
= = = =
+ + + + + +∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
,
(2)
Where yi,t is for Leverage, Short-term leverage and Long-term leverage; Bankdep1 is for bank
dependence 1; Bankdep2  is for bank dependence 2; Monetarypolicy is monetary policy; βi,t is
the coefficient of xi,t; a is the constant term; xi,t is for Tangfassets, EBIT, Retearnings, Non-debt
overtax shields, Accountspay, Logsales, Gdp Growth and Equity to debt over ratio; Wt is a
dummy variable, and 1 If it belonging to the t cross-section, and 0 if not, t=1,2,…T; D i is a
dummy variable, and 1 If it belonging to the i cross-section, and 0 if not, i=1,2; Industry is a
dummy variable; ui is the fixed effects; εi,t is the residuals.
4. Results and discussion 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 depicts the results  about  the descriptive statistics of the financial indicators in the
panel data set, which consists of 8124 observations of different ownership over the period
2003-2011. Among them, the number of state-owned enterprises observations is 4452 and
non-state-owned enterprises is 3672. The average ratio of leverage, long-term leverages and
short-term leverage of state-owned enterprises are 0.527, 0.072 and 0.455, higher than the
non-state-owned enterprises of 0.449, 0.065 and 0.3844. And the Retearnings of non-state-
owned  enterprises  is  at  an  average  of  0.073,  significantly  higher  than  the  state-owned
enterprises  (-0.112).  What’s  more,  the  average  equity  to  debt  ratio  of  non-state-owned
enterprises is 2.443, significantly higher than the state-owned enterprises (1.487). As a result,
the  asset  quality  of  non-state-owned  enterprises  is  better  than  that  of  state-owned
enterprises.
Nature of
enterprise
 Leverage
Long-
term
leverage
Short-
term
leverage
Tangfassets EBIT Retearnings
Non-
debt tax
shields
Accountspay Logsales
Equity to
debt ratio
Non 
state-owned
enterprises
Mean 0.4495 0.0650 0.3844 0.9625 0.0675 0.0729 0.0584 0.1225 2.0844 2.4433
N 3672 3672 3672 3672 3672 3672 3672 3672 3666 3672
Std. 0.2388 0.0963 0.1995 0.0344 0.0562 0.9893 0.0592 0.0955 0.5748 3.6322
Min 0.0203 0.0000 0.0117 0.7555 -0.3979 -58.150 -0.4324 0.0000 -1.4407 -0.8325 
Max 5.9700 2.2968 3.6732 1.0000 0.4927 0.7171 0.4424 0.5621 4.2097 48.359
State owned
enterprise
Mean 0.5269 0.0722 0.4547 0.9670 0.0619 -0.1128 0.0507 0.1235 2.1672 1.4874
N 4452 4452 4452 4452 4452 4451 4452 4451 4444 4452
Std. 1.2442 0.1600 1.1128 0.0364 0.5930 6.4025 0.5936 0.0998 0.5980 1.9868
Min 0.0283 0.0000 0.0260 0.4930 -1.0210 -251.76 -1.1183 0.0000 -0.1823 -0.9879 
Max 82.5596 8.8267 73.732 1.0000 39.313 12.773 39.313 0.5544 4.4948 34.361
Table 3. The descriptive statistics of the panel data for enterprise's financial indicators in different
ownerships (where m is the mass, x is the displacement)
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It depicts the descriptive statistics results of the financial indicators about different industries
during the year of 2003-2011 in Table 4. 
Industry  Leverage Long-leverage
Short-m
leverage Tangfassets EBIT Retearnings
Non-
debt tax
shields
Accountspay Logsales
Equity
to debt
ratio
The food and 
beverage 
Mean 0.451 0.044 0.407 0.950 0.063 0.058 0.052 0.080 2.081 2.089
N 542 542 542 542 542 542 542 542 542 542
Std. 0.210 0.058 0.196 0.043 0.080 0.235 0.086 0.068 0.557 3.154
Min 0.027 0.000 0.019 0.772 -0.311 -1.659 -0.325 0.000 0.517 -0.459
Max 1.848 0.350 1.846 1.000 0.392 0.647 0.364 0.414 3.855 35.440
Petrochemical
Mean 0.458 0.084 0.374 0.963 0.061 0.102 0.047 0.110 2.135 2.104
N 1260 1260 1260 1260 1260 1260 1260 1260 1260 1260
Std. 0.189 0.102 0.168 0.035 0.063 0.128 0.066 0.075 0.460 3.204
Min 0.020 0.000 0.019 0.773 -0.322 -1.319 -0.362 0.000 0.102 -0.051
Max 1.054 0.535 1.034 1.000 0.502 0.576 0.497 0.422 3.980 48.360
Electronics
Mean 0.371 0.048 0.322 0.970 0.054 0.092 0.045 0.118 1.955 3.191
N 589 589 589 589 589 589 589 589 590 589
Std. 0.183 0.073 0.170 0.025 0.064 0.165 0.067 0.084 0.529 4.156
Min 0.028 0.000 0.012 0.802 -0.509 -1.820 -0.528 0.000 -1.074 0.044
Max 0.958 0.517 0.907 1.000 0.245 0.551 0.233 0.548 3.784 34.279
Metal and 
nonmetal
Mean 0.516 0.102 0.413 0.968 0.064 0.096 0.049 0.117 2.440 1.476
N 1055 1055 1055 1055 1055 1054 1055 1054 1055 1055
Std. 0.175 0.097 0.161 0.031 0.058 0.192 0.061 0.076 0.671 2.277
Min 0.032 0.000 0.018 0.796 -0.265 -4.287 -0.284 0.000 0.487 0.020
Max 0.981 0.479 0.971 1.000 0.599 0.591 0.561 0.422 4.171 30.489
Machinery 
and 
equipment
Mean 0.459 0.040 0.418 0.963 0.059 0.086 0.052 0.166 2.115 2.045
N 2104 2104 2104 2104 2104 2104 2104 2104 2103 2104
Std. 0.197 0.071 0.182 0.032 0.051 0.165 0.054 0.112 0.585 2.826
Min 0.028 0.000 0.028 0.695 -0.431 -2.795 -0.460 0.000 -0.182 -0.560
Max 2.271 2.083 0.980 1.000 0.352 0.510 0.347 0.562 4.495 34.978
Pharmaceutical
and biotech
Mean 0.402 0.045 0.357 0.951 0.074 0.119 0.064 0.092 1.950 2.741
N 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800
Std. 0.194 0.060 0.180 0.039 0.069 0.170 0.072 0.077 0.502 3.618
Min 0.028 0.000 0.023 0.741 -0.257 -0.962 -0.285 0.000 0.385 0.035
Max 0.966 0.413 0.954 1.000 0.493 0.717 0.442 0.459 3.740 34.362
Real estate
Mean 0.707 0.141 0.566 0.986 0.089 -0.952 0.081 0.068 1.911 0.940
N 937 937 937 937 937 937 937 937 925 937
Std. 2.692 0.316 2.404 0.031 1.287 14.058 1.287 0.064 0.579 1.361
Min 0.045 0.000 0.045 0.493 -1.021 -251.76 -1.118 0.000 -1.441 -0.988
Max 82.560 8.827 73.733 1.000 39.313 12.774 39.313 0.454 3.856 21.006
Wholesale 
and retail
Mean 0.553 0.048 0.504 0.965 0.056 0.080 0.046 0.164 2.337 1.191
N 837 837 837 837 837 837 837 837 835 837
Std. 0.182 0.067 0.175 0.040 0.052 0.132 0.054 0.124 0.581 1.461
Min 0.069 0.000 0.063 0.750 -0.398 -1.507 -0.432 0.000 0.511 -0.114
Max 1.128 0.411 0.931 1.000 0.365 0.617 0.359 0.560 4.210 13.579
Total
Mean 0.492 0.069 0.423 0.965 0.064 -0.029 0.054 0.123 2.130 1.919
N 8124 8124 8124 8124 8124 8123 8124 8123 8110 8124
Std. 0.936 0.135 0.835 0.036 0.441 4.786 0.441 0.098 0.589 2.890
Min 0.020 0.000 0.012 0.493 -1.021 -251.76 -1.118 0.000 -1.441 -0.988
Max 82.560 8.827 73.733 1.000 39.313 12.774 39.313 0.562 4.495 48.360
Table 4. The descriptive statistics of the financial indicators panel data in different industries
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Among  them,  the  number  of  food  and  beverage  industry  observations  is  542,  the
petrochemical  industry  is  1260,  the  electronics  industry  is  589,  the  metal  and  nonmetal
industry  is  1055, the machinery  and equipment  industry  is  2104, the pharmaceutical  and
biotech industry is 800, the real estate industry is 937, and the wholesale and retail industry is
837. The average ratio of leverage, long-term leverages and short-term leverage of the real
estate industry are 0.527, 0.072 and 0.455, apparently higher than any other industries. And
the average  Accountspay of machinery and equipment industry and the wholesale and retail
industry are 0.166 and 0.164, generally higher than any other industries. In addition, the
electronic industry (3.19) has the highest equity to debt ratio and the real estate industry
(0.94) the lowest. So asset structure of the real estate industry is different from that of other
industries, and its debt structure was significantly greater than other industries.
Table 5 and Table 6 are the results about the Pearson correlation test of each variable. Leverage
is significantly positively correlated with Long-term leverage and Short-term leverages (0.776,
0.995); especially the correlation between Leverage and Short-term leverage almost approaches
1. Distinctively, both Leverage and Short-term leverage have strong positive relationship with
EBIT,  Non-debt  over  tax shields,  Accountspay,  and Logsales,  while  Long-term leverage  and
Accountspay are significantly negatively related. This illustrates that, corporations with stronger
profitability have higher asset-liability ratio and short-term debt rate, and mainly depend on
short-term debt to solve the accounts payable rate problems. Leverage, Long-term leverage, and
Short-term leverage have a significantly negative correlation with Retearnings and Equity to debt
ratio  (-0.161,  -0.182 and -0.151),  which  indicates  that  the debt maturity  structure  can be
reduced as the Retearnings and equity increased.
Leverage Long-leverage
Short-
leverage Tangfassets EBIT Retearnings
Non-debt
tax shields Accountspay Logsales
Leverage 1
Long-term
leverage .776** 1
Short-term
leverage .995** .707** 1
Tangfassets .011 .043** .005 1
EBIT .955** .707** .955** .018 1
Retearnings -.57** -.418** -.573** -.020 -.57** 1
Non-debt 
tax shields .950** .703** .951** .022* 1.00** -.576** 1
Accountspay .052** -.114** .077** -.004 -.02* .028* -.023* 1
Logsales .324** .176** .274** .081** .18** .206** .166** .366** 1
N 8124 8124 8124 8124 8124 8124 8124 8124 8124
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
Table5. Correlations matrix, table of Pearson correlation test for each variable
Table  6  shows  that  Leverage,  Long-term  leverage  and  Short-term leverage  are  inversely
related to industry and the ownership of enterprise significantly, indicating that the debt levels
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of mechanical and equipment, medical biology, real estate, and wholesale and retail industry
are higher than those of the food, petrochemical, electronics and metal industry. Moreover, the
debt level of state-owned enterprises is higher than that of the non-state-owned enterprises.
Leverage and Short-term leverage have a significantly negative correlation with the Year (-
0.032 and -0.039), showing that, the debt financing circumstance of enterprises in the sample,
which is affected by monetary policy and financial restrictions, is increasingly tightening over
the period 2003-2011.
Leverage Long-termleverage
Short-term
leverage Industry Year
Nature of
enterprise
Equity to
debt ratio
Leverage 1
Long-term leverage .776** 1
Short-term leverage .995** .707** 1
Industry .052** .022* .055** 1
Year -.032** .020 -.039** -.041** 1
Nature of enterprise .041** .026* .042** .006 -.457** 1
Equity to debt ratio -.161** -.182** -.151** -.106** .195** -.165** 1
N 8124 8124 8124 8124 8124 8124 8124
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
Table 6. Correlations matrix, table of Pearson correlation test for each variable
4.2. Regressions results
First, we analyze the dynamic characteristics and factors of Leverage, Short-term leverage and
Long-term leverage under the influence of the current monetary policy, and the main results of
fixed effects regression are shown in Table 7.
Leverage is positively correlated with Bankdep1, EBIT, Accountspay and Logsales significantly,
indicating that enterprises with bigger asset size and higher profitability have easier access to
bank loans, thus resulting in  an increase of asset-liability ratio. This is consistent with the
conclusions of many researches both in China and abroad (Leary, 2009; Voutsinas & Werner,
2011; Xunan-Feng,  2012). Leverage has a significantly  positive association with Year2005,
Year2006,  Year2008,  Year2009  and  Year2011,  stating  that  regardless  of  the  financial
constraints and the impact of monetary policy, the listed companies in China tend to depend on
long-term bank debt finance. Significantly, Leverage is negatively related to Retearnings and
Equity to debt ratio, indicating that the higher the equity ratio of the corporation the lower the
asset-liability ratio is. In addition, Leverage was negatively associated with the Non-debt tax
shields and Nature of enterprise, which declaring that the asset-liability ratio reduced due to
the  decline  of  tax  ratio.  And  relative  to non-state-owned  enterprises,  the  state-owned
enterprises  push  down  the  asset-liability  ratio more. The  value  of  R2  (within)  and  R2
(between) are 0.574 and 0.689, which indicate a good fit for the model created. And the P
value of Hausman test is 0, so a fixed effects model was supported.
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Variable Leverage Short-term leverage Long-term leverage
Bankdep1
Bankdep2
Money Policy
Tangfassets
EBIT
Retearnings
Non-debt tax shields
Accountspay
Logsales
Nature of enterprise
equity to debt ratio
GDPg
Year2004
Year2005
Year2006
Year2007
Year2008
Year2009
Year2010
Year2011
Constant
0.0318 ***
(9.58)
0.0025
(0.78)
0.0065
(0.84)
0.0651
(1.74)
3.9874***
(28.5)
-0.2483***
(-37.5)
-4.2197***
(-30.87)
0.1814***
(11.2)
0.0654***
(14.07)
-0.0064**
(-2.34)
-0.0347***
(-42.39)
0.0031
(1.56)
0.0107
(1.39)
0.0236***
(5.42)
0.0346***
(7.66)
(omitted)
0.0149***
(3.34)
0.0376***
(7.54)
0.0054 
(0.67)
0.0355***
(3.42)
0.2357***
(5.51)
0.0576***
(20.54)
-0.0539***
(-19.89)
0.0143**
(2.2)
0.0433 
(1.38)
0.0167 
(0.14)
-0.0923***
(-16.55)
-0.0299 
(-0.26)
-0.1717***
(-12.59)
0.0177***
(4.52)
0.0006 
(0.28)
-0.0090***
(-13.08)
-0.0011 
(-0.65)
-0.0107
(-1.65)
0.0056 
(1.52)
-0.0198***
(-5.22)
(omitted)
0.0133*** 
(3.54)
0.0312*** 
(7.43)
0.0146** 
(2.18)
0.0182** 
(2.09)
0.0265 
(0.74)
-0.0257***
(-7.52)
0.0564***
(17.08)
-0.0078 
(-0.99)
0.0217 
(0.57)
3.9706*** 
(27.63)
-0.1560*** 
(-22.94)
-4.1898*** 
(-29.85)
0.3530*** 
(21.23)
0.0477*** 
(9.99)
-0.0070**
(-2.5)
-0.0257***
(-30.55)
0.0042*
(2.05)
0.0213*** 
(2.71)
0.0180*** 
(4.03)
0.0545*** 
(11.74)
(omitted)
0.0016 
(0.35)
0.0064 
(1.24)
-0.0092 
(-1.13)
0.0173 
(1.62)
0.2091*** 
(4.76)
R-sq: within
        between
overall
corr(u_i, Xb)
sigma_u
sigma_e
rho
chi2
Hausman
0.5738
0.6886
0.6866
0.0316
0.1232
0.0713
0.7489
841.38
0.0000
0.1835
0.1934
0.2125
0.0559
0.0588
0.0601
0.4897
101.05
0.0000
0.4819
0.6909
0.6276
0.0476
0.1049
0.0733
0.6720
412.81
0.0000
P-values are  in  parenthesis;  ***  Indicates  statistical  significance  at  the  0.01  level;  **  Indicates
statistical significance at the 0.05 level. * Indicates statistical significance at the 0.10 level
Table 7. Fixed-effects Regression of model-1
Short-term leverage has significantly positive relation to Bankdep1, Money Policy and Logsales,
declaring that corporations with more profit would increase the ratio of short-term debts in the
crunch.  This  is  in  line  with  the  report  of  Wenchao-Ma  and Siyue-Hu  (2012).  Short-term
leverage  is  positively and significantly related to Year2008, Year2009, Year2010, Year2011,
showing that after the financial crisis, the deterioration of the operating environment led a
number of listed companies to make up the gap of working capital by short-term debts.  There
is  a  negative  and  significant  relationship  between  Short-term  leverage and  Bankdep2,
Retearnings and Equity to debt ratio, indicating that corporations with high equity to debt ratio
have low short-term debt ratio. In addition, Short-term leverage has a negative and significant
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correlation with Accountspay, stating that listed companies in China mainly rely on long-term
liabilities to solve the problems of Accounts Payable. However, one needs to think over this
question from the cost of working capital. The P value of Hausman test is 0, which supports
the fixed effects model. While the value of R2 (within) and R2 (between) are 0.183 and 0.193,
suggesting a poor fit for the model.
Long-term leverage has positive association with Bankdep2, EBIT, Accountspay, Logsales and
GDPg, significantly. It indicates that enterprises with strong profitability have easier access to
bank loans,  thus led to an increase of  their  asset-liability  ratio.  While the enterprises will
increase the ratio of long-term debt since they take an optimistic view about the economic
situation. This is in accordance with many researching results in both China and aboard (Leary,
2009; Wenchao-Ma  & Siyue-Hu, 2012; Xunan-Feng, 2012). Long-term leverage is positively
and significantly related to Year2004, Year2005, Year2006, declaring that the long-term bank
debt finance of listed companies in China is related to economic expectations and financial
restrictions.  Long-term  leverage  has  significant  and  negative  correlation  with  Bankdep1,
Retearnings and Equity to debt ratio, showing that the higher the equity ratio of the corporate
is, the lower the asset-liability ratio is. Moreover, Long-term leverage is negatively associated
with the Non-debt tax shields and Nature of enterprise, which declaring that the asset-liability
ratio reduced due to the decline of tax ratio. And relative to non-state-owned enterprises, the
state-owned enterprises have lower asset-liability ratio. With a good fit for the model, the R2
(within) and R2 (between) have the value of 0.482 and 0.691, and the P value of Hausman
test is 0, so a fixed effects model was accepted.
Table 8 shows the results  of  the fixed effects  regression under  the influence of monetary
policy, which has been lagged once.
Leverage has significantly positive correlation with Bankdep1, EBIT, Accountspay and Logsales.
It indicates that enterprises with bigger asset size and higher profitability have easier access to
bank loans, thus result in an increase of their asset-liability ratio, which is consistent with the
empirical results in Table 7. Significantly, Leverage is positively related to Year2006, but it is
negatively  correlated with Year2008, stating that  the debt structure of listed companies in
China is vulnerable to the impact of financial constraints and monetary policy. 
Leverage is negatively correlated to Retearnings and Equity to debt ratio significantly, this
indicates that the corporate with higher equity ratio would have a lower asset-liability ratio. In
addition,  Leverage  was  negatively  associated  with  the  Non-debt  tax  shields,  Nature  of
enterprise and GDPg, which declaring that the asset-liability ratio reduced due to the decline of
tax ratio. And relative to non-state-owned enterprises, the state-owned enterprises will have
lower asset-liability ratio. At the same time, enterprises will decrease the asset-liability ratio
since they have optimistic economic expectations, which is in contrast with the conclusions of
Table 7. With a good fit for the model, R2 (within) and R2 (between) have the value of 0.572
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and 0.690, and the P value of Hausman test is 0, so the regression model of Leverage supports
the fixed effects model.
Variable Leverage Short-term leverage Long-term leverage
Bankdep1
Bankdep2
Money Policy(t-1)
Tangfassets
EBIT
Retearnings
Non-debt tax shields
Accountspay
Logsales
Nature of enterprise
equity to debt ratio
GDPg
Year2004
Year2005
Year2006
Year2007
Year2008
Year2009
Year2010
Year2011
Constant
0.0265***
(9.11)
0.0030 
(1.08)
0.0008 
(0.09)
0.0296 
(0.77)
2.9317***
(20.83)
-0.1408***
(-16.04)
-3.1893***
(-23.13)
0.1670***
(10.41)
0.0471***
(9.91)
-0.0044
(-1.76)
-0.0477***
(-47.21)
-0.0024*** 
(-3.37)
-0.0142 
(-1.66)
-0.0054
(-1.6)
0.0204**
(2.21)
(omitted)
-0.0169***
(-5.28)
0.0028
(0.31)
-0.0072 
(-0.8)
(omitted)
0.4261***
(10.65)
0.0509***
(19.49)
-0.0505***
(-20.12)
-0.0116
(-1.5)
0.0029
(0.08)
-0.3029**
(-2.4)
0.0044
(0.55)
0.2325* 
(1.95)
-0.1605***
(-11.16)
0.0099**
(2.32)
0.0007
(0.29)
-0.0135***
(-14.89)
-0.0044***
(-6.75)
-0.0377*** 
(-4.93)
-0.0194***
(-6.39)
-0.0384***
(-4.64)
(omitted)
-0.0160*** 
(-5.58)
-0.0130 
(-1.62)
-0.0016 
(-0.19)
(omitted)
0.1602*** 
(4.46)
-0.0244***
(-7.42)
0.0535***
(16.96)
0.0124
(1.28)
0.0267
(0.62)
3.2346*** 
(20.38)
-0.1452*** 
(-14.67)
-3.4219*** 
(-22.01)
0.3274*** 
(18.11)
0.0372*** 
(6.93)
-0.0051
(-1.79)
-0.0342***
(-30.02)
0.0019**
(2.38)
0.0236** 
(2.45)
0.0140*** 
(3.67)
0.0588*** 
(5.65)
(omitted)
-0.0009 
(-0.24)
0.0158 
(1.56)
-0.0056 
(-0.55)
(omitted)
0.2660*** 
(5.89)
R-sq: within
        between
overall
corr(u_i, Xb)
sigma_u
sigma_e
rho
chi2
Hausman
0.5716
0.6902
0.6842
0.0752
0.1175 
0.0596 
0.7955 
973.51
0.0000
0.1871
0.1815
0.2125
0.0915
0.0627 
0.0534 
0.5794 
228.47
0.0000
0.4666
0.6846
0.6175
0.0813
0.1017
0.0672
0.6964
463.87
0.0000
P-values are  in  parenthesis;  ***  Indicates  statistical  significance  at  the  0.01  level;  **  Indicates
statistical significance at the 0.05 level. * Indicates statistical significance at the 0.10 level
Table 8. Fixed-effects Regression of model-2
Short-term  leverage  has  significantly  positive  relationship  with  Bankdep1  and  Logsales,
indicating that  more  profitable  corporations  would  increase  their  ratio  of  short-term debt.
Short-term leverage was positively associated with the Non-debt tax shields, declaring that the
asset-liability ratio increased due to the decline of tax ratio. There is significant and negative
relation between the Short-term leverage and Year2004, Year2005, Year2006, Year2008, and it
is in contrast with the conclusions of Table 7. What’s more, Short-term leverage is significantly
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and  negatively  related  to  Bankdep2,  Retearnings  and  Equity  to  debt  ratio,  indicating  that
corporations with higher equity ratio have lower short-term debt ratio. In addition, Short-term
leverage has a negative correlation with EBIT, Accountspay and CDPg, and it is statistically
significant. This states that listed companies in China mainly rely on long-term liabilities to
solve the problems of Accounts Payable. At the same time, the enterprises will decrease the
asset-liability ratio since they have optimistic expectations. The P value of Hausman test is 0,
which supports the fixed effects model. While the value of R2 (within) and R2 (between) are
0.183 and 0.193, suggesting the poor fit for the model. 
Significantly, Long-term leverage has positive association with Bankdep2, EBIT, Accountspay,
Logsales and GDPg, significantly. It indicates that enterprises with strong profitability have easier
access to bank loans, thus led to an increase of their asset-liability ratio. While the enterprises
will increase the ratio of long-term debt since they take an optimistic view about the economic.
This is in accordance with many research both in China and aboard (Leary, 2009; Wenchao-Ma &
Siyue-Hu, 2012; Xunan-Feng, 2012). What’s more,  Long-term leverage is positively related to
Year2004,  Year2005,  Year2006,  declaring  that  the  long-term  bank  debt  finance  of  listed
companies is related to economic expectations and financial restrictions. Long-term leverage was
significantly  and negatively  correlated with Bankdep1, Retearnings and Equity to  debt ratio,
showing that the higher the equity ratio of the corporate is, and the lower the asset-liability ratio
is.  In  addition,  Long-term leverage  is  negatively  associated  with  the Non-debt  tax  shields,
declaring that the asset-liability ratio reduced due to the decline of tax ratio. With a good fit for
the model, the value of R2 (within) and R2 (between) are 0.467 and 0.685, and the P value of
Hausman test is 0, so a fixed effects model of Long-term leverage was supported.
5. Conclusions
Based on the debt maturity structure theory and learning from Leary (2009), Voutsinas and
Werner  (2011),  this  study designs a model  to investigate  the dynamic characteristics  and
factors of debt maturity structure. It offers an empirical analysis of Chinese listed companies in
different  industries  under a  macroeconomic  environment  of  non-tradable  shares  reform,
financial crisis, tax reform and monetary policy. Using a panel data set of 8124 observations
during 2003-2011, we found that, besides the enterprise characteristic factors, corporate debt
maturity structure is sensitive to economic expectations, monetary policy, financial restrictions
and changes in tax rates. The results of the empirical study show that:
• The debt maturity structure of state-owned enterprises is significantly higher than that
of  non-state-owned enterprises,  indicating  that  state-owned enterprises  faced  more
favorable financing environment than the non-state-owned enterprises; 
• Corporations with larger scale of assets and more profitable have higher asset-liability
ratio, and the phenomenon is reversed when it comes to the corporations with higher
equity to debt ratio.
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• Long-term  debt  ratio  and  asset-liability  ratio  is  related  to  economic  expectations,
monetary policy, financial restrictions and changes in tax rates.
•  After  the financial  crisis,  the  deterioration  of  the  operating  environment  caused a
number of listed companies in China to make up the gap of working capital by short-
term debt.
• Resulting from reduction in tax rate, the short-term debts of corporations increased, but
the long-term debts ratio and asset-liability ratio dropped down.
• Listed companies in China mainly rely on long-term liabilities to solve the problems of
Accounts Payable, however, ones still need think over this question from the point of
view of the cost of working capital.
Overall,  in  some  way, the  conclusions  of  this  paper  contribute  to  the  study  of  dynamic
characteristics  and factors  of  debt  maturity  structure.  However,  there is  still  a  lot  can be
further studied, for instance, the impact of lagged monetary policy, the determinants of short-
term debt ratio and the cost of operating.
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